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1. PREFACE
Microorganisms are integral constituents of the environment and are primarily
responsible for the recycling of biomass in nature. With their simple structure and
dynamic physiology, microbes can adapt rapidly to environmental changes. They are
capable of growing on almost every natural and synthetic material that attracts moisture
and organic debris. Some microorganisms may produce environmental pollutants as
metabolic byproducts; for example, acetaldehyde and isooctanol are produced by some
fungi when colonizing polyurethane and po!yvinylchloride, respectively.
Microorganisms affect human life in space m many ways, including risks related to in-
flight infection or allergy as well as possible damage to the spacecraft itself through
system fouling and biodeterioration.
Considering the number of known microbial species, only a relatively small number of
microorganisms are known to cause serious diseases in healthy humans. The list of
potential pathogens becomes nearly endless in compromised individuals. Recent
studies suggest that microgravity, cosmic radiation, anxiety, and other stresses related to
space travel may affect the immune system adversely. It is well known that even so-
called "harmless" environmental or endogenous microbes may cause fatal infections in
compromised hosts. It is, therefore, often impossible to delineate "harmless"
microorganisms from those traditionally recognized as etiologic agents of disease.
Thus, even innocuous constituents of the environmental and the endogenous flora could
threaten health during long duration space missions.
Space Station Freedom will have a closed environmental system. Continual habitation,
periodic crew exchange, docking of resupply vehicles, biological experiments, and the
presence of experimental plants and animals on board for life-science study will
contribute to its environmental microbial load. Because the capacity of the
environmental control system to remove microorganisms is finite, many microorganisms
will find niches in the interior of the spacecraft. The nature of the substrates and the
effects of microgravity may induce changes in their metabolic activities through
environmental selection, resulting in changes to their virulence and sensitivity to
disinfectants and antibiotics.
A carefully designed pro.gram aimed at understanding the significance of the microbes
present in the space station environment is of paramount importance. The objectives of
this conference were to review, validate, and recommend revisions to the microbial
acceptability standards proposed for air, water, and internal surfaces on board Freedom.
In conjunction with the review of these standards, the advisory panel also evaluated the
proposed microbiological capabilities and monitoring plan, and discussed disinfection
procedures, waste management, and other clinical and crew issues.
2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Microorganisms have a profound effect on the health and well-being of all inhabitants
of Earth. The severe morbidity and mortality associated with epidemics and
opportunistic infections in individuals are well documented. Most opportunistic
infections are caused by either members of an individual's normal flora,
microorganisms of environmental origin, or a combination of both. In a closed system
such as Space Station Freedom, the potential morbidity and subsequent mortality
resulting from microorganisms is very difficult to estimate; however, the experiences of
the Soviet space program demonstrate that morbidity resulting from infectxon is not a
theoretical issue. Microorganisms may elicit allergic reactions as well as infectious
disease, both of which contribute to decrements in crew health and productivity. In
addition to microorganisms brought to the Freedom environment by each crewmember
during their tours of duty, it must be assumed that a resident microbial population will
be established, and that this population will change over the life span of the station. As
the station evolves, each crewmember will be at risk of infection or allergic reaction
caused by the changing microbe populations originating from other crewmembers and
from the station environment. In addition to crew health, the importance of microbes
as agents of biodeterioration and potential harm to the station itself has not been
adequately addressed.
This conference was convened for the purpose of reviewing NASA's plans for
microbiology on Space Station Freedom. In the opinion of the advisory panel, ensuring
the health of Freedom crews requires the establishment of a well-defined research effort
to determine the potential effect of microorganisms on the crewmembers and on the
physical environment of the space station. While the panel endorsed NASA's overall
plan, they made several recommendations to address potential weaknesses in the plan.
The panel strongly recommended that the questions considered at this conference be
answered by a consolidated, goal-oriented research program. There are very few data
addressing the fundamental question of how microgravlty influences microbial function.
To answer this question, the panel advised using Earth-based microbial models, with
subsequent validation by in-flight Shuttle data. The need for in-flight data, as well as
reliable data collected immediately before launch and immediately after landing, was
emphasized repeatedly throughout the conference.
The scope of NASA's research effort must accommodate the fact that as crews change
and the station ages, specific environmental pressures will force microorganisms to
respond to these stimuli by adapting to them. Crew health problems will parallel
interactions between the crew's immune system and their resident flora and microbes in
the physical environment of the station. The panel therefore stated that any standards
formulated for Freedom must be viewed as dynamic rather than static, because they will
require revision during the evolution of the station from assembly through habitation.
The panel also advised that failure to implement such a research program may subject
the crewmembers to unnecessary health risks.
Other specific suggestions as to appropriate standards, sampling techniques, and
sampling frequencies can be found in Section 5 of this report. In conclusion, the panel
recognized that NASA has a unique opportunity to assume a greater leadership role by
actively supporting and guiding the necessary research efforts.
3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
3.1 Space Station Freedom
Space Station Freedom (SSF), a major international development effort, will consist of
four modules, four nodes, and several attached components. The two U.S. modules are
each 44 feet long and 14 feet in diameter; one will function as a multipurpose
laborato_ area for conducting experiments in materials and life sciences, and the
second wall serve as the habitation area for the crewmembers. These two modules will
be connected by four nodes, the precise dimensions of which are yet to be determined.
Other components of Freedom will include a hyperbaric chamber, two international
modules (the National Aerospace Development Agency of Japan's Japanese
Experimental Module and the European Space Agency's Columbus), and logistics
modules for transporting cargo and waste products to Earth.
It has been estimated that assembling the space station will require between 21 and 23
shuttle flights of varying duration, with frequent extravehicular activities (EVAs).
During imtial construction and assembly, crews will live in both the Orbiter and
Freedom. As construction nears completion, a crew of four will live full-time on board
Freedom; additional assigned crewmembers will bring the final crew to 8. Length of
missions will increase incrementally from 30 days to 90 days, and then to a final
maximum duration of 180 days. The first element launch for the project is scheduled
for early 1995. The first manned mission is planned for mid 1997; the assembly process
is anticipated to be complete in late 1998. The total life span of Freedom is expected to
be 20 to 30 years.
The major health care issues that must be considered during the entire assembly
process, from beginning to completion, include the physical stresses of microgravity,
frequent EVAs during the construction stage, increased exposure to radiation, living in
the closed environment with recycled air and water, and limited accessibility owing to
the long turn-around time for a rescue mission. Issues of waste management and
storage are also of concern, particularly after experimental plants and animals are
brought on board.
Environmental and clinical microbiology capability on Freedom resides in two
subsystems of the Crew Health Care System (CHeCS) (Table 1). The principal goal of
the CHeCS is to protect the crew's health and maximize their operational efficiency.
CHeCS is designed to provide medical diagnosis and treatment for critical and
noncritical levels of care; to monitor the spacecraft environment; and to maintain the
crew's physical conditioning during the physiological stresses of living in microgravity.
Its three subsystems, the Health Maintenance Facility, the Environmental Health
Subsystem, and the Exercise Countermeasures Facility, are described briefly below.
TABLE 1. CREW HF_,ALTH CARE SYSTEM (CHeCS)
Health Maintenance Facility
* Medical operations support
Environmental Health Subsystem
* Environmental monitoring
Exercise Countermeasures Facility.
*Physical conditioning eqmpment
The Health Maintenance Facility is designed to function as a remote medical facility.
Crewmembers will have access to an extensive medical database, a hyperbaric chamber
for use as necessary, and the capability of providing critical care life support for up to 45
days. The Environmental Health Subsystem monitors the station's environment,
providing a means of detecting environmental hazards that can adversely affect the
crew. The third subsystem, the Exercise Countermeasures Facility, contains several
specialized computer-controlled exercise devices designed to counteract or minimize
the negative physical effects of deconditioning.
The Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) will be designed and
built to meet the medical requirements established by the Environmental Health
Subsystem of CHeCS. The ECLSS consists of 7 subsystems (Table 2); the latter four
subsystems, Waste Management, Atmosphere Control and Supply, Atmosphere
Revltalization, and Water Recovery Management, are of particular interest at this
conference.
TABLE 2. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL & LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM (ECLSS)
Extravehicular Activity Support (EVAs)
* Extravehicular servicing subsystem fluid supply and return
* Airlock and hyperbaric chamber support
Temperature and Humidity Control (THC)
* Air temperature and humidity control
* Ventilation
* Equipment air cooling
* THermally conditioned storage
Fire Detection and Suppression (FDS)
Waste Management (WM)
* Return waste storage
* Fecal waste processing
Atmosphere Control and Supply (ACS)
* Oxygen and nitrogen storage and distribution
* Ventilation and relief
* Oxygen and nitrogen pressure control
Atmosphere Revitalization (AR)
* Carbon dioxide reduction and removal
* Oxygen generation
Water Recovery and Management (WRM)
* Urine processing
* Hygiene water processing
* Potable water processing
* Water storage and distribution
* Water thermal conditioning
Current requirements for volatile organic contaminants in respirable air are based upon
7-day spacecraft maximum acceptability concentrations; these values will be revised to
reflect exposure periods of 90 days or more. Temperature and humidity control systems
will be duplicated in order to provide redundancy as a safety feature. Air will be
filtered wath HEPA filters, which will be cleaned periodically by vacuuming their
surfaces. Ventilation design includes atmospheric control and supply, and atmospheric
revitalization. The latter includes schemes for carbon dioxide removal and control of
trace contaminants.
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Water Systems. Space Station Freedom will have two water systems, one that provides
potable water and one that provides hygiene water (Figure 1). Each system will be
duplicated so that the Habitation and Laboratory Modules will each have their own
supply of both types of water. Water from these systems will be supplied to the two
international modules as well. The microbial standard proposed for both water systems
is 1 colony-forming unit (CFU) per 100 ml. Potable water will originate from
condensate and carbon dioxide reduction, whereas hygiene water will be obtained from
waste water originating from the galley, showers, and urine recycling. Hygiene water
will not be recycled for use as potable water. Disinfection of both water systems will be
accomplished chemically with iodine and physically with heat. An iodine concentration
will be maintained between 1 and 4 ppm in the water systems by an iodinated exchanse
resin similar to that in the current Orbiter system. The two water systems will be static,
with water from the processor units being distributed at 30 to 45 psia through either
stainless steel, or possibly titanium pipes. Backflow will be prevented by maintaining
positive pressure m the system. Check valves will also be installed if necessary.
FIGURE 1. Space Station Freedom Water Systems
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In the potable water process, condensate water is collected, filtered, and then heated
for 20 minutes at 250-270 ° F. The water exits through a regenerative heat exchanger
and enters a multifiltration unit, where sorbent beds remove contaminants and
maintain iodine level. After water quality is assessed by a process-control water-quality
monitor, the water is pumped to a set of storage tanks. While the first tank is being
filled, water in the second tank is held pending results of microbial testing, water in the
third tank serves as a back-up, and water from the fourth tank is in use. Each 165-1b
tank holds enough water for a crew of eight for two days.
In the hygiene water process, water is collected, filtered, and heated for 20 minutes at
250 ° F. The water exits through a regenerative heat exchanger and blends with reject
water (brine) from the reverse-osmosis membrane module. The water mixture
accumulates in a holding tank, passes through an ultrafiltration (UF) module, and
proceeds on to the spiral-wound reverse osmosis membrane module, which removes
Inorganic and organic components. At this point, depending upon conductivity, the
brine is either maxed with fresh feed or shunted to the urine processor. From the
holding tank, the second-stage permeate enters posttreatment sorbent beds, where it is
"polished" by a set of beds similar to those used m the potable water processor. Water
quality measurements are performed and then the water is stored briefly in a
preprocessing storage tank. Hygiene water will be processed continuously at a rate of
400-500 lbs per day. Urine will be processed separately. The processed urine is
evaluated at the end of the processing loop and either sent to the hygiene water system
or reprocessed through the urine system again. Wet solid wastes will not be recycled.
All water-recovery processors will be monitored for pH, iodine concentration (by
ultraviolet absorption), conductivity, and total orgamc carbons (by infrared detection)
by the Water Quality Control Monitors (WQCM). Gases present will be vented to
trace contaminant control. If the water quality fails, the water stream is diverted back
to the preprocessing storage tank and then reprocessed. The WQCMs will also monitor
and analyze the potable and hygiene water systems at the storage tanks. The monitors
will operate continuously and evaluate samples every 24 hours. Components to be
analyzed include conductivity, pH, turbidity, color, ammonia, biocide level, specific
ions, inorganic constituents, total organic carbons (TOCs), uncharacterized organic
carbons (UTOCs), organic acids, complete organic constituents, total bacteria,
dissolved gas, and free gas.
3.2 Some Physiological Effects of Space Flight
What effects will space flight have upon organisms? Can medical problems be
predicted and prevented during space flight? Most of the data gathered to date in
attempts to answer these fundamental questions have been obtained from Skylab, and a
few 4- to 7-day Shuttle flights. Although the Soviet space station Mir has been manned
continuously for periods of more than one year, Mir is not equipped to conduct routine
biomedical studies.
One common "side effect" of space flight is space motion sickness. During the first few
days of flight, approximately 75% of the crewmembers experience some symptoms of
space motion sickness. The degree of illness varies depending upon the position and
movements of the crewmembers, particularly movements of the head. Theories
regarding the cause of space motion sickness have included sensory conflict, sensory-
vestibular overload, and body fluid shifting; unfortunately, no predictors of who will
experience space motion sickness have yet been defined.
Microgravity-induced shifting of body fluids toward the head, while probably not a
cause of space motion sickness, has been shown to affect the functioning of the
cardiovascular system. Cardiovascular investigators at JSC have developed a "stand
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test"asa meansof quantifying cardiovascular..... deconditioning, during which the subjects'
heart rate and blood pressureare momtored during suddenchangesm body posmon.
One fairly successfultechnique developedfor counteracting the cardiovasculareffects
of fluid shifting during spaceflight involvesingestingisotonic saline immediately before
landing. "Salineloading" hasbeenshownto affect the vascularspaceand musculature
of blood vessels.Other techniquesthat arebeing explored include application of
negativepressureto the lower body and the useof exercisetraining protocols.
Someof the other important physiologicaleffectsof spaceflight include an unexplained
calcium loss,which leadsto bone demineralization, and bone lossin the spine. Muscle
massand musclestrengthare alsolost, with roughly twice the strengthbeing lost
compared to the mass. Serumcortisol levels increaseand then decreaseproportionally
with the length of time the crewmemberspendsin microgravity. Red blood cell mass
decreasesby approximately 15%within one to two months. The immunoglobulins
increasein amount and then diminish. Mitogenic responseof lymphocytesis decreased.
Infection is a documentedproblem, particularly urinary tract infections. The incidence
of urinary tract infections in Apollo astronautshas resulted in a preflight quarantine
policy. Two Soviet cosmonautsreturned to Earth before their scheduledreturn
becauseof infections that could not be treated in space. It is not clear whether these
infections involved the urinary tract. Performanceand behavior changesassociated
with isolation and confinement,particularly on long-duration flights, will affect crew
compatibility. Theseand other physiologicaleffectsof spaceflight must be evaluatedin
order to ensurethe health and well-being of the crew.
3.3 Microbiological Issues
While specimensfor microbial analysisarecollected routinely before and after Space
Shuttle flights, opportunities for in-flight samplinghave beenlimited. Sampling sites
and materialshave included air, internal surfaces,water, and food. Internal surfaces
sampledinclude areasin the flight deck, the middeck, and Spacelab. According to
current protocols, air and internal-surface samples are collected at launch minus 30
days, launch minus one day, and on the day of landing. The crew quarters are sampled
10 days before launch, and water on the Shuttle is sampled 20 days and 3 days before
launch, and 5 days after landing, although concern has been raised that sampling water
this late after landing is particularly misleading. Samples from the Shuttle's food lots
are also sampled.
Air samples are taken using a centrifugal air sampler, which uses agar impaction as the
collection principle. Different agar media are used in the sample strips to culture
bacteria and fungi. One strip is intended to culture bacteria, whereas the second strip is
used to monitor fungi. Air samples obtained from the Orbiter flight deck and middeck
typically contained fungi such as Aspergillus and PeniciIlium spp., as well as bacteria like
Bacillus and Micrococcus spp. It has been noted that Staphylococcus spp., normally.
associated with skin, have been recovered in large numbers from surfaces, but not trom
air samples.
In-flight sampling took place durin_ STS-51B (Spacelab 3) because of microbial
concerns involving the operation otthe Research Animal Holding Facility (RAHF) in
the Spacelab. Air samples, RAHF surface samples, and samples from crewmembers'
throats and hands were taken during the mission. Numbers of airborne fungi and
bacteria in the Spacelab tended to increase during this flight, to a maximum of 200
CFU/m 3. Surface samples from the RAHF showed a predominance of Staphylococcus
spp.; the crewmembers who changed the waste trays harbored Staphylococcus and
Streptococcus spp.
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Under the NASA Outreach Program, investigators at the University of Alabama at
Huntsville have evaluated a number of potential monitoring methodologies for use on
board Freedom. Such technologies must be capable of functioning in microgravity,
manage multiple sample types, provide analytical data within 30 minutes to 6 hours, and
fall within stringent power, weight, and volume constraints. Current methods with
potential applications on board Freedom include particulate detection, culture
technology, and recognition of indicator microorganisms. Some conventional methods
for determining numbers of living microorganisms in ground-based models include
membrane filtration, epifluorescent microscopy, direct viable counts, and microcolony
enumeration either by direct microscopy or by using fluorescent indicators.
The aforementioned study evaluated 29 potential methods for "technological maturity"
using weighted factors for various engineering requirements and feasibihty criteria. Of
these 29 methods, 6 fulfilled the following criteria: requires minimal modification to
existing equipment; near real-time; nondestructive to living cells; noninvasive; requires
minimal crew time; can potentially identify organisms; and possesses discriminatory
capability. Technology is not available for detecting or estimating the amount of
volatile or microbial products in real time.
3.4 Summary: JSC Microbiological Plan for Space Station Freedom
Plans for microbiology on board Freedom include analysis of clinical and environmental
samples in order to maintain the health, safety, and productivity of the crew. Thus, the
microbiologyplan falls within two subsystems of the Crew Health Care System
organization (Table 1). Clinical information will consist of microbial identification and
determination of susceptibility to antimicrobial agents, whereas enviro_ental data will
be used to monitor microbes m air, in water, and on internal surfaces. The
microbiological plan for Freedom must consider constraints involving limitation of
equipment weight, power and volume, the amount of crew time and the crew's
preference for completely automated systems, the amount of waste generated,
maintenance requirements, shelf life of system components, and the reliability and
validity of the data generated. The importance of having in-flight microbiological
capability has been highlighted by the early termination of two Soviet flights due to
infections during flight. It is clear that the lack of in-flight data, and the limitations on
collecting "clean" preflight and postflight samples has resulted in a database that is
insufficient to allow predictions of microbial behavior during extended missions.
Vitek's AutoMicrobic System II (AMS-II) has been designed for use in flight as a
clinical microbiology assessment tool. Current requirements for clinical microbiology,
as defined by the Health Maintenance Facility, include isolation and identification of
pathogenic bacteria, fungi, and parasites from body fluids or tissues (blood, urine, feces,
cerebrospinal fluid, wounds, skin, eye, and vagina) (Fig. 2); determination of the
antimicrobial susceptibility of recovered pathogens; and adequate containment of
microbiological specimens. The AMS-II will also be used to support the identification
component of the environmental microbiology plan (Fig. 3).
FIGURE2.. Microbiological Assessment on Space Station (Clinical)
SSF
'-3S¢"
LOWER
RESPIRATORY
WOUNDS"
ABSCESSES"
MISC ELLAN EOUS"
Sputum
Direct ID Gram
for Stain
Mycoplasma
Swab Fluid
Gram
Stain
Isolation
Media
Isolation
Media
SEPTICEMIA
Blood
Culture Bottle
with
A ar Slant
a_ram
Stain
UTI" UROGENITAL" ENTERIC"
Uhne Swab/Exudate Stool
(0 Hrs)
Dip Paddle
Culture
Microbiologist
Physician
1 1L'"Parasites
Isolation Isolation
Media Media (18 hrs)
I
• Identification and antimicrobial sensitivity testing complete within 20 to 26 hours after specimen collection
for 75% of the pathogens isolated from cases in these categories.
(24-36 hrs)
FIGURE 3. Microbiological Assessment on Space Station (Environmental)
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The environmental microbiology plan includes microbial monitoring of air, internal
surfaces, and water. Data obtained from most samples will be archived and transmitted
to Earth for analysis. A summary of the current environmental standards and
monitoring plans is presented in Table 4. Because current methodologies have not
been designed for use in microgravity, a significant research effort wilI be required to
develop the equipment needed for the monitoring protocols.
TABLE 4. PROPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL MICROBIOLOGY STANDARDS
Acceptability limits
Instrument
Sampling frequency
Acceptability limits
Instrument/Method
Monitoring frequency
Acceptability limits
Instrument/Method
Frequency
Air
500 CFU/M 3.
Reuter Centrifugal Air Sampler
Weekly
Internal Surfaces
Undefined
Swab, culture, or RODAC plates
As required
Water
1 CFU/100 ml**
Filtration/culture; epifluorescent microscopy
Each lot of reclaimed and recycled water
*bacteria and fungi
**1 CFU, bacteria or fungi per 100 ml; 1 PFU, viruses per 100 ml
Water monitoring strategies for the potable and hygiene water systems will address
both planktonic (free-floating) and adherent microorganisms. Because these
microorganisms occupy different niches in the two water systems, different strategies to
monitor them will be required (Fig. 4). As Freedom ages, the water quality
requirements may change, especially as biofilms develop.
FIGURE 4. STRATEGIES FOR MONITORING WATER
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Epifluorescent microscopy is the current method of choice for the routine monitoring of
planktonic microorganisms. Drawbacks to this approach include the need for large
volumes of water, extensive experience, and the toxicity of acridine orange, the stain
proposed for direct microbial counts in water. Other techniques and stains are
probably too labor-intensive because they require skillful handling. Techniques for
determining viability counts using membrane filter culture or dehydrated media must
be adapted to O-g; for example, pouring agar plates is not feasible in microgravity. In
addition, the amount of storage space will be restricted.
Protocols for monitoring adherent microorganisms occurring as biofilms have not yet
been developed. Remediation, assessment, and identification are problems that need
to be resolved. Visual assessment of biofilm development, in-line removable filters,
and viable-count techniques are possible approaches to be incorporated into strategies
for monitoring adherent microorganisms.
The conference panel was charged with reviewing and recommending revisions to the
proposed standards for the microbiology program on board Space Station Freedom
(Table 4), with particular attention to the following series of questions:
Air
Is the present standard of 500 CFU/M 3 an appropriate limit for air samples?
Are acceptability limits for specific groups of airborne microorganisms
necessary?
How often should air be sampled?
Internal Surfaces
Is surface sampling necessary?
How often should surfaces be sampled?
What are acceptable limits for surface samples?
Water
How often should water be sampled?
Is the present standard of 1 CFU/100 mi an appropriate limit for water samples?
Which technologies for inflight verification of water sampling are appropriate?
Are acceptability limits for specific groups of water-borne microorganisms
necessary?
In summary, a number of problems specific to the space station environment will need
to be overcome. In general, activities require greater manipulation and effort in
microgravity than on Earth. The basic biology of the microorganisms encountered as
contaminants may differ significantly from those organisms brought initially to Freedom.
Factors like radiation, iodination, and oligotrophic (low nutrient) conditions may
provide significant selective pressures. Because two separate water systems must be
monitored, special problems associated with each may exist. Finally, the
microbiological experience of the crewmembers may be minimal. Monitoring strategies
must consider these aspects for the development of a sound program.
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4. PANEL DISCUSSIONS
4.1 Monitoring Considerations
It is clear that criteria must be developed for monitoring, isolating, and identifying
microorganisms present in the space station environment. The selection of sampling
techniques will have a major effect on determining the appropriate standards.
Determining the actual numbers of microorganisms in air, water, and on internal
surfaces willbe important, because comparisons of these numbers, as well as the taxa
that are isolated, will permit the crew to detect microbial population changes. Specific
indicator organisms should be selected, to include the microorganisms associated with
biodeterioration and known potential pathogens. A series of standards that parallel the
evolution of the station will be necessary for several reasons: The crew's immunologic
function may change with increased time spent in microgravity; crews will be
exchanged; and various selective pressures on Freedom will affect the microbial
population on board. The entire process must be looked upon as being dynamic rather
than static. Standards for acceptability will be affected by future needs and
technological advancements. Monitoring protocols must be developed that correlate
with the developmental stages of Freedom, from the initial construction period to the
final functioning space station. Flexibility in system design is important because it will
allow for technological upgrades. It will be paramount to understand the microbial
dynamics of a closed system that operates in a microgravity environment.
4.1.1 Internal Surface Mon#oring
The question was posed whether there are differences between the microbiology of air
and internal surfaces in microgravity. The answer is probably yes, because internal
surfaces will become contaminated by specific microorganisms associated with the
movements of the crew. Individuals willtend to contact the same general areas as they
move about in the station, thereby establishing a localized microbial flora at the contact
sites. Selection of sampling sites should correlate with individuals' routes of travel and
their work-flow patterns. Some areas, those touched frequently by the crew, should be
considered at risk for surface contamination. These sites will correlate with personal
habits, movements and work tasks, and may change significantly with the introduction
of new crews and assigned work tasks.
Other surfaces of special importance will include ducts, condensation areas, and areas
exhibiting visible growth. Wet surfaces, which may not always be visible, represent
special potential problems. Hidden sites such as condenser coils may serve as localized
niches where microorganisms such as fungi can proliferate. If at all possible, these sites
should be cultured routinely for fungi. The panel recommended that access ports to
such potential problem areas be provided for sampling. If growth were to occur in
these unmonitored sites, microorganisms could potentially affect the baseline microbial
population recovered in air samples in number, in taxa, or both.
The composition of different surfaces such as space suits, HEPA filters, fabrics, plastics,
metals, glues, and rubbers may provide different substrates that can support the growth
of different microorganisms. People may actually represent the most important
surfaces for supporting microbial growth and shedding of microorganisms into the
environment.
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It is important to realize that the microbial burden on internal surfaces will not
correlate with data from air samples. While surfaces will provide sites for microbial
growth, air will act as a distribution vehicle for aerosolized organisms. These and
similar considerations will be related to the surfaces selected for sampling, the sampling
protocols, sample size and frequency of sampling, and the standards established to alert
the crew that changes in the numbers of microorganisms or microbial taxa represent a
potential or real problem that must be addressed promptly.
Sampling methods should be formulated for fungi, bacteria, and certain parasites but
not viruses, since practical approaches for monitoring viruses and other organisms such
as amoebae that could be present on Freedom do not exist at this time. The panel
judged swabs to be an acceptable, simple technique for surface sampling; where
culturing is appropriate, swabs could be inoculated subsequently to media for recovery
of microorgamsms. The use of acetate films or strip tape for fungal collection and
identification by direct microscopy is a preferred approach. Fungi need not be cultured
in all instances for identification. Ideally, the amount of isolation and identification
work conducted on Freedom, particularly with fungi, should be kept to a minimum in
order to reduce the potential of biohazards. Microscopic examination of specimens for
fungi can be conducted on Earth via telemicroscopy. The composition of the microbial
populations on board Freedom cannot be predicted at this time; however, it should
remain relatively constant over the life of the station barring accidents, contamination,
or infections. Because fungi produce airborne propagules, any amount of fungal growth
in a closed system must be discouraged.
The change in number or type of microorganisms is more important than the actual
numbers because this reflects the dynamics of population changes. In addition to
monitoring for the environmental health aspects of crew safety, these data may be
extremely important as a means to monitor for biodeterioration. The frequency of
sampling should be correlated with the general housekeeping protocols for Freedom,
because these will help determine the microbial load in the environment at a given
time. The frequency and selection of sites for sampling will be significantly influenced
by the routine cleaning schedules.
4.1.2 Air Monitoring
According to current plans, air in the space station environment will be passed through
HEPA filters on the inlet side. Even though cabin air will be filtered, food particles and
other residues are expected to be present m the air, and may become associated with
internal surfaces. These particles can serve as nutrient substrates for microbial growth.
Playing with food, as reported to occur in the Space Shuttle Program, should be
discouraged. Free water in the air and associated with internal surfaces may pose
additional problems. The HEPA filters will be replaced either every 90 days, or if the
pressure across the filters drops. The panel noted that if the station air runs
continuously, then changing the filters could contaminate the entire atmosphere. The
panel recommended the addition of HEPA filters on the air outlet side as well as the
air inlet side.
The panel recommended that sampling of air and surfaces be done wherever water
condenses. Locations to be sampled will depend upon the atmospheric supply and its
control mechanisms; sampling air vents for bacteria like Legionella should be
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considered. Frequency of air sampling, like surface sampling, will depend upon crew
activities, housekeeping chores, cleaning agents, and air distribution patterns. Although
a firm recommendation cannot be made at this time, biweekly monitoring would be
considered appropriate.
As to numerical standards, the panel felt that the proposed standard of 500 CFU/m 3 is
too low, and recommended that at least two acceptability standards be established
instead, one for bacteria and another for fungi. These standards, whether numerical or
taxonomic, should reflect the chosen method of data gathering and analysis. The
Reuter centrifugal air sampler (RCS), for example, is not an efficient means of
monitoring fungi, nor is rose bengal agar appropriate for their selective isolation. Air
sampling methods and corresponding standards should be based upon numbers of
propagules per unit of air sampled. For example, a standard acceptable for use of the
RCS would be 500 CFU/m 3, whereas 1500 CFU/m 2 would be realistic for a particulate
sampler.
Routinely cultivating fungi from air samples will probably not be necessary; fungi can
instead be trapped on microscope slides for microscopic examination. It should be
noted that fungal-bacterial aggregates are more likely to occur. Cultivating mixed
microbial populations of bacteria and fungi will require some microbiological skill.
Unfortunately, crewmembers skilled in rmcrobiological techniques may not be present.
Of equal concern, the time necessary to spend on microbial isolation, isolate
purification, and isolate identification procedures will most likely not be available. Like
internal surfaces, the types of air environments to be sampled, the selection of sites,
frequency of sampling, and methods to be used are important components of the
monitoring plan and the standards to be followed.
4.1.3 Water Mon#oring
For consistency, water standards should be the same for both the potable and hygiene
water systems, and these standards should reflect the effectiveness of the two systems in
keeping the water microbe-free. The panel felt that the number of bacteria present is a
more meaningful criteria than the presence or absence of coliform bacteria. They
judged that the proposed standard of 1 CFU/100 ml is unrealistic. To achieve a
standard of 1 CFU/100 ml would be expensive and labor-intensive, if it could be done
at all. A 1-ml unit was thought to be more appropriate because of the limited amount
of water on Freedom. The panel recommended adopting the National Committee for
Clinical Laboratory Standardization (NCCLS) standard of 10 CFU/ml, which was
established for heat or filter-sterilized distilled water coming directly from a water tap.
Thepresence of 10 CFU/ml can be monitored easily with the dipstick technique. This
standard will probably have to be modified over time because of the eventual
development of biofilms, which will significantly affect the numbers of organisms in the
water systems. The particu_tes that slough off from biofilms within water systems can
contain as many as 10'* to 10a organisms/ml.
The current standard for viruses is 1 PFU/100 ml. While the panel believed this
standard should be zero, it was acknowledged that methods to detect viruses in water
are not readily available. In addition to standards for numbers of organisms, it was
suggested that a limit of 10 ug/ml for microbial carbon products be established, since
these products provide carbon sources for growth of organisms and biofilm formation.
The issue of identifying specific taxa also must be addressed. It is believed that the
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filters in the currently planned system will filter out obvious pathogens from the water,
which places a greater emphasis upon identifying potential opportunistic pathogens. In
any case, the detection level established must be well below potential infectious levels
in order to ensure crew safety.
The selection of sampling techniques for use on Freedom must take into consideration a
number of points. In order to provide meaningful data, water from the two water
systems should be tested at the point of use, not in the tanks. The quality of the water
entering the s_,stem is critical. The sampling method adopted should provide a rapid
turn-around time for isolation and subsequent identification. Rapid methods often rely
upon complex equipment that will probably exceed cost, volume, weight, and power
constraints. Even though approaches like dipstick and filtration methods are not
necessarily the fastest, they are more suited for Freedom. Sampling frequency must
take into account the effectiveness of the water treatment process.
The design and implementation of the water treatment system is of paramount
importance to the quality of the water produced. Experience with the Research Animal
Holding Facility at Ames Research Center suggests that it is very difficult to keep
condensate water free of microorganisms. Under the current system, water is moved
rapidly from the raw form through the treatment process to the consumption state,
because holding hygiene water for longer than 24 hours creates insurmountable storage
problems. The water system should be processing continuously, since turning the
systems on and off will lead to instability of treatment barriers and possible
breakthrough of microorganisms that proliferate in treatment stages. Although heat is
an effective disinfectant, dead spots in the heat-processing component of the system are
cause for concern. The panel questioned the 20-minute 250°F treatment process, and
strongly recommended instituting fail-safe mechanisms such as recirculation should the
heating cycle or temperature fall below standard.
The treatment train design must include provisions for the eventual development of
microbial resistance to disinfectants like chlorine and iodine. Studies using silver
chloride resins at the ends of water-treatment systems have shown that microorganisms
can develop resistance within weeks. Such data raise the question of whether iodinating
the water at the end of the treatment process will be useful. Plans should be formulated
for decontaminating the water systems in the event that they do become contaminated
and the disinfectants are no longer effective.
Finally, much concern was expressed regarding biofilm development on Freedom.
Organic and inorganic contaminants will form a nutrient base for biofilm development.
The reduction of biofilms should not be attempted with either ozone or heat, since both
processes degrade the biofilms into smaller compounds that provide a nutrient base for
new biofilm formation.
The panel strongly recommended establishing the entire water reclamation system as a
test bed at NASA and studying it for at least two years. Such a model could be
challenged with potential microbial problems. Organisms to be considered in the
evaluatmn of the system should include hepatitis A virus, Cryptosporidium spp.,
Klebsiella pneumoniae, Escherichia coli serotype 0157:H7, Mycobacterium spp.,
poliovirus, MS2, and parvovirus.
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4.2 Prevention and Disinfection
As a means of reducing the numbers of microorganisms associated with surfaces, it was
suggested that surface materials be impregnatedwith antimicrobial agents. However,
because these agents will eventually leach from surfaces (off-gas) and enter the
atmosphere, toxicological problems may arise. An alternative suggestion for sterilizing
surfaces was ultraviolet light. However, this method has several disadvantages: it
requires too much power, and cadmium and mercury are banned from use on board
Freedom. Disinfectants like hydrogen peroxide may represent a simple solution to the
disinfection issue. Energy should be devoted to evaluating possible candidate
disinfectants. In general, the numbers of microorganisms can be greatly reduced if the
relative humidity of the atmosphere were to be maintained below 50%.
The panel proposed establishing a ground-based space station mockup for use as a
model for microbial study. Such a model could be useful in characterizing the resident
flora, with and without crew habitation.
4.3 Containment and Waste Management
Since microorganisms in the space station environment as well as in clinical specimens
are potential opportunistic pathogens, a biological safety cabinet is an absolute
requirement for the microbiology monitoring program. The safety cabinet must be
used when processing samples originating from air, water, internal surfaces and clinical
specimens. Crewmembers must be especially careful when handling cultures in liquid
media in microgravity. Extreme care must be used to ensure that fungi maintained in a
containment facility are not released into the environment. It was recommended that
incubators and waste disposal units interface directly with the biological safety cabinet
to ensure that microorganisms do not escape. Because of the physical difficulties of
working in microgravity, the panel recommended that the safety cabinet be at the P-3
level. Disinfection of work surfaces in the biological safety cabinet, as well as other
surfaces, must be well planned. Because Freedom is a closed system, localized
contamination incidents could become station-wide problems within an extremely short
time. Disinfectants like hydrogen peroxide, chlorhexidine, or betadine were suggested
to be used for wiping surfaces. Alternative disinfection processes, such as passing
incubator components through disinfectants like paraformaldehyde, alcohol, chlorine,
or quarternary ammonium compounds pose unacceptable toxicological or fire hazards.
Using autoclaves is not practical because of excessive power consumption.
The air flow design for the biological safety cabinet has not yet been established. In
addition, the method for evacuation of waste that is generated in the biological safety
cabinet must be determined. McDonnell-Douglas is currently addressing these design
concerns.
Much of the microbiology to be conducted on Freedom will rely upon microscopy. The
panel felt that the microscope could be housed separately from the biological safety
cabinet. Placement of the microscope in the biological safety cabinet would reduce the
amount of available workspace. In addition, the microscope could easily become
contaminated. It was suggested that a video camera should be used in place of the
microscope eye pieces, with the eye pieces being available on board. Having
telemicroscopic-telerobotic capability on board would reduce the crew time required to
analyze mixed samples. Video or still images could be transmitted easily to a ground
base, where they.could be analyzed by experienced microbiologists. The location of the
microscope reqmres further discussion.
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4.4 Clinical and Crew Issues
Because microbial problems have been noted after brief extravehicular activities
(EVAs), space suits should be monitored for contamination. This will be especially
important during the early assembly stages of the Station because of the many EVAs
that will be required. It is important to understand that space suits may develop their
own microbial ecosystems through accumulation of body fluids and associated flora.
In order to understand microbial dynamics in a closed microgravitational system, it was
suggested that baselines for normal crewmember flora be determined, and
crewmembers monitored routinely thereafter. At this time, there are no standards for
this type of data. Because it is possible that an immunocompromised state of some
degree may develop durin_g long space flights, baseline data on microbial flora, both
clinical and environmental, will be necessary in order to protect the health of the crew
as their susceptibility increases.
17
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A panel of distinguished scientists was charged with reviewing and recommending revisions
to NASA - Johnson Space Center's microbiological plan for Space Station Freedom. The
panel endorsed the overall plan, which is described in detail in Section 3.4, and offered the
following conclusions and recommendations.
In order to protect crew health, safety, and productivity on board Freedom, the standards
formulated for clinical and environmental microbial analysis must be viewed as dynamic
rather than static. During the station's evolution from assembly to habitation and
throughout its projected lifetime, these standards will require revision because of the
significant microbial population changes that will likely occur. In addition, standards will
also change as technologies for the detection of microbes improve.
In general, availability of sampling techniques and their application will have a profound
effect on the establishment of the initial standards for the station. In order to effectively
monitor microbial population dynamics, microbial numbers as well as taxa must be
determined in air, on internal surfaces, and in water. It should be noted that when setting
quantitative limits, all microorganisms cannot be treated alike. Specific indicator
organisms should be selected, as well as microorganisms that must be excluded from the
station. As an example, those microorganisms listed as Class 2 (National Institutes of
Health - Centers for Disease Control Classification) (Table 5) should be viewed with great
caution. The presence of Class 3, 4 or 5 microorganisms should be considered totally
unacceptable.
The panel's specific observations and recommendations are listed below.
Surface Monitoring:
Surface sampling was agreed to be necessary, but can be limited to areas at high risk of
contamination.
Sampling sites should include places that the crew physically touches, as well as areas in
which water condenses, and areas of visible growth.
Selection of sampling sites should take into account the composition of the surfaces to be
sampled, as each has the potential to serve as a substrate for different types of organisms.
The frequency with which surfaces should be sampled will be influenced significantly by
housecleaning procedures on board Freedom, and cannot be established at this time.
The panel did not reach a consensus on acceptable limits for surface contamination, but
recommended that changes in the numbers or types of microorganisms should be
monitored rather than actual microbial counts, because changes reflect microbial
population dynamics.
Surfaces can be sampled with swabs, with subsequent inoculation to media when necessary.
Isolation and identification, particularly of fungi, should be kept to a minimum in order to
avoid station-wide contamination.
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Air Monitoring:
An appropriate frequency for air sampling cannot be established without additional
information on the filter system.
A second HEPA filter should be added on the air outlet side.
The method of changing air filters should be selected carefully. If the station's air
system runs continuously, changing the filters could contaminate the entire atmosphere.
Air, like surfaces, should be monitored wherever water condenses.
Seoarate numerical standards should be established for bacteria and for fungi;
500 CFU / m 3 may be too stringent for bacteria plus fungi.
Cultivation of fungi should be kept to an absolute minimum; trapping fungi on slides for
microscopic analysis may be sufficient, particularly if downlinking is available for Earth-
based analysis.
Water Monitoring:
Water standards should be the same for both the potable and the hygiene water systems.
Water should be tested at the faucet, not in the storage tanks.
Fail-safe mechanisms, such as water recirculation, should be instituted in the event of
heating-cycle failure.
The current standard of 1 CFU / 100 ml for bacteria, yeasts, and moulds was judged too
stringent and cannot be defended on the basis of crew health. The panel recommended
adopting the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standardization standard of 10
CFU / ml, with the understanding that this standard will change over time as biofilms
develop in the water supply.
A standard of 10 CFU/ml can be monitored easily during flight with dipstick technology.
While the standard for viruses and other enteric organisms should be zero, it is
acknowledged that detection methods are not presently available.
Ten ug/ml of microbial carbon products should be introduced as a standard.
The capability of identifying specific taxa is required in order to identify potential
opportunistic pathogens.
Sampling frequency must take into account the effectiveness of the treatment train, and
cannot be determined at this time.
A water system test bed should be run on Earth for at least 2 years, and challenged
microbially before the system is instituted in flight.
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Prevention and Disinfection:
Candidate disinfectants should be evaluated for their potential toxicologic effects.
Microbial numbers can be reduced considerably if the relative humidity is maintained
below 50%.
A ground-based space station mockup should be used for characterizing the microbial
flora, both with and without crew habitation.
Containment and Waste Management:
A biological safety cabinet is an absolute requirement. Incubators and waste disposal
units should be interfaced directly with the unit.
Surfaces should be wiped down with disinfectants such as hydrogen peroxide,
chlorhexidine, or betadine.
Air flow in the cabinet, and evacuation of waste from it, must be determined.
The microscope should be located outside of the biological safety cabinet.
Clinical and Crew Issues:
Space suits should be monitored regularly for contamination.
Baselines for normal crew flora should be established, and crewmembers monitored
routinely afterward.
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TABLE 5.
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH- CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
CLASSIFICATION OF MICROORGANISMS ON THE BASIS OF HAZARD
BacteriaI Agents
Acinetobacter calcoaceticus
Actinobacillus spp.
Actinomyces spp.
Arachnia propionica
Aeromonas hydrophila
Arizona hinshawii (all serotypes)
Bacillus anthracis
Bordetella spp.
Borrelia recurrentis
B. vincentii
Ca.mpylobacter fetus
C. ]ejuni
Chlarnydia psittaci
Ch. trachomatis
Clostridium botulinum
CI. chauvoei
CI. haemolyticum
CI. histolyttcum
Cl. novyt
CI. septicum
CI. tetani
Corynebacterium diptheriae
C. equi
C. haemolyticum
C. pseudotuberculosis
C. pyrogenes
C. renale
Edwardsiella tarda
Erysipelothrix insidiosa
Escherichia coli
*all enterop.athogenic, enterotoxigenic,
enteroinvasive, and strains bearing K1
antigen
Haemophilus ducreyi
H. infllienzae
Klebsiella spp. (and serotypes)
Legionella pneumophila
Leptospira interrogans spp.
Li_teria spp.
Moraxella spp.
Mycobactenum spp. (except Class 3)
Mycoplasma spp.
(except Mycoplb.sma mycoides and
Mycoplasma agalactiae ) (Class 5)
N-eisseria gon oirh oeae
N. meningitidis
Nocardia spp.
Pasteurella spp. (except Class 3)
Salmonella spp. (and serotypes)
Shigella spp. (and serotypes)
Sptiaerophorus necrophorus
Staphylococcus aureus
S_treptobacillus moniliformis
Streptococcus pneumoniae
S. pyogenes
Treponema carateum
T. pallidum
T. pertenue
Vibria cholerae
V. parahaemolyticus
Yersinia enterocolitica
CLASS 2 AGENTS
Blastomyces dennatitidis
Cryptococcus neofonnans
Paracoccidioides brasiliensis
P_rasitic Agent_
Entamoeba histolytica
Leishmania spp. (sp)
Naegleria gruberi
N. fbwleri
Schistosoma mansoni
Toxoplasma gondii
Toxocara canis
Trichinella spiralis
Trypanosorna cruzi
Viral, Ricksettial, and Chlamydial Agents
Adenoviruses (human, all types)
Cache Valley Virus
Coronaviruses
Coxsackie A and B viruses
_Cytomegaloviruses .
Echoviruses (all types)
Encephalomyoca/'ditis virus (EMC)
Flanders virus
Hart Park virus
Hepatitis-associated antigen material
Herpesvirus-associated antigen material
Herpesviruses (except Herpesvims simiae )
(Class 4)
HTLV IflI
HIV
Influenza viruses (except A/PRS/34)
(Class 1)
Langat virus
Measles virus
Mumps virus
Parainfluenza viruses
(except virus 4, SF 4 strain) (Class 1)
Poliovtruses (all types, wild & attenuated)
Poxviruses
except Alastrim, Smallpox, & Whitepox)
Class 5)
except Monkey pox) (Class 3 or 4)
Rabies virus (except Rabies street vtrus)
(Class 3 or 4)
Reoviruses, all types
Respiratory syncytial virus
Rhiflovirus'es, all types
Rochalimaea insonu
Rubella virus
Simian viruses
(except Herpesvirus simiae & Marburg
•;'irus.) (Class 4)
Sindbls ;¢irus
Tensaw virus
Turlock virus
Vaccinia virus
Varicella virus
Vesicular stomatitis virus
Yellow fever virus (17D vaccine strain)
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TABLE5,continued
CLASS3AGENTS
B_cterial Agents
Bartonella spp.
Brucella spp.
Francisellit tularensis
cobacterium avium complex
boris
M tuberculosis
Pasteurella multocida type B
Pseudomonas mallei
P. pseudomallei
Yersinia pestis
Fungal Ag_nt.s
Coccidioides immitis
Histoplasma capsulatum
Histoplasma capsulatum var duboisii
P_r_itic Agents
none
Viral, Rickettsial, and Chlamydia_! Agents
Arboviruses
(except members of Classes 2 & 4)
Coxiell-a burnetti
Ehrlichia spp.
Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus
(LM-C) •
Monkey pox virus
Rabies street virus
Rickettsia spp. (except R. nm_inantium )
West Nile wrus
Semliki Forest virus
D engu e virus* *
Yellow fever virus (wild)*
CLASS 4 AGENTS
Bacterial, Fungal, Parasitic Agents
none
Viral, Ri.ckcttsial, and Chlamydial Agents
Ebola fever virus
Hemorrhazic fever agents:
Crimean liemorraglc fever
Congo virus
unin virus
Maehul3o virus
HerpesvFrus simiae (Monkey B virus)
Lassa fever virus (Mastomys natalensis)
Marburg virus (Carcopithecus spp.)
Monkey pox**
Tick-borne encephalitis virus complex:
Russian spring-summer encephalitis
Kyasanur forest disease
Omsk hemorrhagic fever
Central European encephalitis viruses
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
(epidemic str ares)**
Yellow fever virus (wild)**
*when used in vitro
**when used for transmission or animal experiments
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TABLE 5, continued
CLASS 5 AGENTS
AD2-SV40**
AD7-SV40*
Adenovirus*
African horse sickness virus
African swine fever virus
Alastrim
Avian Leukosis*
Besnoitia besnoiti
Borna disease virus
Bovine infectious petechial fever agent
Bovine Leukemia*
Bovine Papilloma*
Camelpox virus
CELO*
Dog Sarcoma*
EBV**
Ephemeral fever virus
FeLV* *
FeSV**
Foot and mouth disease virus
Fowl plague virus
GaLV**
Goal pox virus
Guinea Pig Herpes*
Hamster E,eukemia*
HTLV I/II*
Hog cholera virus
HVAteles**
HV Saimiri**
Louping ill virus
Lucke ('l_rog)*
Lumpy skin disease virus
Marek's virus*
Mason-Pfizer Monkey Virus*
Mouse Mammary Tumor*
Murine Leukeml"a*
Murine Sarcoma*
M___..m_ycOplasmaagalactiae
oides
Nairobi sheep disease virus
Newcastle disease virus (velogenic strains)
Polyoma*
Rat Leukemia*
Rat Mammary Tumor*
Rickettsia ruminantium (heart water)
Rift Valley fever virus
Rhinderpest virus
Rous Sarcoma*
Sheeppox virus
Shope Fibroma*
Shope Papilloma*
Smallpox
SSV-I**
SV-40*
Swine vesicular disease virus
Teschen disease virus
Theileria annulata
T. boris
T. hirei
T. lawrencei
T. parva (East Coast Fever)
Trypanosoma evansi
Ti. vivar (nagana)
Vesicular exanthema virus
Wesselsbron disease virus
Whitepox
Yaba*'*
Zyonema
*low-risk oncggenic virus.
**moderate-ns]_ oncogemc virus
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6. PANELIST PRESENTATIONS
Donald G. Ahearn, Ph.D.
Georgia State University
Biodegradation
Microorganisms, in addition to potentially causin_g opportunistic infections, may cause
the biodeterioration of surfaces, particularly fabracs. Fabrics containing wool or cotton
are often damaged by microbes. Antimicrobial compounds incorporated into fabrics,
rubbers, plastics and other components of SSF may be required as a means of
preventing or reducing biodeterioration of surfaces caused by microbes.
The numbers of microorganisms are more important than the taxa involved. An
exception, of course, would be the unlikely presence of an established mould pathogen
or pathogenic bacterium. Monitoring programs must emphasize the microbial load
rather than the taxa of microorganisms. The microorgamsms that are associated with
biodegradationprocesses do not occur as individual components such as conidia, but
rather consist of mycelial clumps that often contain bacteria. Any system used to
monitor microorganisms on internal surfaces, in air, and in water must be sensitive to
the importance of microorganisms capable of causing biodeterioration. Quantitative
sampling will be an extremely important activity.
Libero Ajello, Ph.D.
Centers for Disease Control
Diseases Caused by Common Airborne Fungi
A broad spectrum of filamentous fungi can be potential opportunistic pathogens in the
immunocompromised host. Most of these infections would result from inhaling conidia
or spores by individuals that have compromised immune systems. Because a large
number of these fungi (Tables 6 and 7)could be present in the SSF environment, it will
be important to monitor the environment for their presence.
Most of the potentially dangerous opportunistic fungi will be exogenous, originating
from items brought to the SSF from Earth. However, endogenous potential
opportunistic pathogens such as Candida albicans can also cause serious infections.
24
Table6. KnownAgentsofHyalohyphomycosis
Acremonium
A. alabamensis
A. curvulum
A. falciforme
A. kiliense
A. potronii
A. roseo-griseum
P. mar. quandii
P. vanotu
Penicillium
P. chrysogenum
P. citiinum
P. expansum
P. spinulosum
Anxiopsis
A. fulvescens
A. stereocaria
Pseudallescheda
P. boydii
Beauvaria
B. alba
B. bassiana
Coprinus
C. cinereus
Cylindrocarpon
C. lichenicola (C. tonkinense)
C. vaginae
_s_um
F. chlamydosporum
F. dimemm
F. episphaeria
F. moniliforme
F. nivale
F. oxysffontm
F. prol_feratum
F. saccari
F. solani
F. verticilloides
Scedosporium
S. inflatum
Schizophyllum
S. commune
Scopulariopsis
S. acremonium
S. brevicauhts
Scytalidium
S. hyalinum
Tritirachium
T. oryzae
Tubercularia
T. vulgaris
Lecytophora
L. hoffrn.annii
L. mutabilis
Volutella
V. cinerescens
Microascu$
M. cDwreus
Myriodontium
M. kertinophilum
Paecilomyces
P. _moso-roseus
P. lilacinus
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Table 7. Known Agents of Phaeohyphomycosis
Genera and Species Genera and Species
Altemaria
A. alternata
A. chartarum
A. dianthicola
A. infectoria
A. stemphyloides
A. tenutsslma
Anthopsis
A. deltoidea
Curvularia
C. geniculata
C. tunata
C. pallescens
C. senegalensis
C. verruculosa
Dissitimurus
D. exedrus
Armum
A. leporinum
Aureobasidium
A. pullulans
Bipolaris
B. australiensis
B. hawaiiensis
B. spicifera
Botryomyces
B. caespitosus
Drechslera
D. biseptata
Exophilia
E. castellanii
E. jeanselmei
E. monilae
E. pisciphila
E. salmonis
E. spinifera
Exserohilum
E. longirostratum
E. mcgmnisff
E. rostratum
Chaetomium
C. _nicola
C. globosum
Fonsecaea
F. pedrosoi
Cladorrhinurn
C. bulbillosum
Lasodiplodia
L. theobromae
Cladosporium
C. cladosporioides
C. devriesii
C. datum
C. oxyspomm
C. sphaerospermum
Moniliella
M. suaveolens
Mycocen trospora
M. acerina
Colletotrichum
C. dematium
Coniothyrium
Nattrassia
N. mangiferae
C. fuckelii
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Peyronellaea
P. glomerata
Phaeoannellomyces
P. elegans
P. werneckii
Pyrenochaeta
P. unguis-hominis
Ramichloridium
R. schulzeri
Phaeosclera
P. dematioides
Phaeotrichoconis
1". crotalariae
Phialemonium
P. obovatum
Phialophora
P. bubakii
P. parasitica
P. repens
P. richardsiae
P. verracosa
Pleurophoma
P. pleurospora
ehoma
P. cava
P. crusis-hominis
P. eugyrena
P. her-barum
P. hibernica
P. minutella
P. oculo-hominis
Phyllosticta
P. citricarpa
P. species
Pseudomicrodochium
P. suttonii
Sarcinomyces
S. phaeomuriformis
Scolecobasidium
S. gallopavum
S. humtcola
S. tshawytscha
Scytalidium
S. lignicola
Stenella
S. araguata
Taeniolella
72.stilbospora
Tetraploa
T. anstata
Trichomaris
7". invadens
Ulocladium
U. chartarum
Wangiella
W. dermatitidis
Xylohypha
X. bantiana
X. emmonsii
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Harriet Burge, Ph.D.
University of Michigan Medical Center
Mycology_ of Indoor Air
The basic principles of fungal aerobiology must be applied to the 0-g environment of
Space Station Freedom. Microgravity, as opposed to the restricted space, will be the key
issue onboard Freedom. In microgravity, the morphological form exhibited by fungi
may be significantly different from that expressed on Earth, making the identification of
the fungi on SSF extremely difficult. Owing to the biological stress fungi will experience
in 0-g, physiological parameters will probably vary enough to cause changes in
sporogenesis and conidiogenesis, metabolism, and the production of mycotoxins. If
sexualreproduction occurs more frequently, then there will be greater recombination of
genetic material.
Fungal proliferation can be controlled by lowering the relative humidity to 50% or less
and preventing condensation on surfaces. In reality, this may not be a practical solution
to the potential problem of fungal growth on Freedom. Unlike Earth systems, fungi
present in 0-g will remain in an aerosolized state, and probably will become associated
with floating water droplets and particulate matter in the air.
Monitoring and collection protocols will be important steps in evaluating the air
environment for the presence of fungi. A particulate sampler should be considered as a
means of sampling for the presence of airborne fungi. The presence of viable fungi can
be inferred from particulate collections. Use of cultural sampling for fungi is not
recommended due to the strong potential for aerosolization of viable spores. Total
fungal counts include both viable and dead fungi, both of which may be important
sources of antigens that can produce allergic reactions. Sampling for mycotoxins must
include a means of detecting the toxin itself rather than the fungus that produces the
mycotoxin. It is recommended that toxicological analysis of air should be expanded to
include microbial volatile organic compouncls that are known to be produced as a result
of fungal metabolism.
The HEPA filters, as a component of the air handling system, could serve as a sampler
for fungi and their metabolites. Such an approach requires detailed information
regarding air circulation patterns, occupational patterns, and activity levels and
atterns. Without this type of data, it is premature to determine standards for sampling
equencies and locations.
The biological safety containment cabinet will probably become contaminated by
moulds over time. Of special concern would be fungi likeAspergillusfurnigatus, which
grows on bacteriological culture media. The problem will depend upon how the cabinet
IS used and what its principal functions are.
Fungi in the atmosphere of SSF may cause hypersensitivity disease. Many fungi can
serve as potential antigens that produce hypersensitivity pneumonitis, a seriously
debilitating condition that can cause permanent lung damage and death. Risk factors
for the development of hypersensitiwty pneumonitis are unknown. Fungal antigens also
cause allergic asthma and rhinitis, both of which can seriously compromise humans.
Bacterial endotoxins pose special problems. On Earth, acceptable guidelines for
airborne endotoxins are different for outdoors as compared to indoors. For example,
0.2 ug/m 3 is considered an acceptable limit for outdoor endotoxins, and 4 ug/m 3 for
indoors. There is no reference point for correlating toxins in the SSF environment.
Endotoxin acts as an adjuvant and may increase the risk for development of
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hypersensitivity pneumonitis, making the combination of excessive airborne endotoxin
and fungus propagules potentially deadly. Airborne endotoxins also produce serious
flu-like symptoms (fever, chills, malaise) at high concentrations.
Frederick S. Colwell, Ph.D.
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Environmental Microbiology
The inaccessibility of the environment to be studied (i.e., space) is a major problem in
predicting which microorganisms will colonize SSF. Topics to be considered should
include bloremediation of waste products, especially in the lunar and Mars programs,
biologically activated carbons to reduce the amount of organic carbon sources that
could serve as nutrients, and removal of volatile toxic products produced by fungi and
other organisms. Applying tracer technology to the problem of understanding how and
where microparticulate materials distribute themselves in 0-g would be a useful
approach.
A number of studies are needed in order to better understand and predict the microbial
problems that will probabl_, develop. Selective pressures in microgravity will have a
profound effect on microbial morphology, physiology, pathogenicity, and formation of
biofilms, as well as sensitivity to antibioUcs and disinfectants.
The Vitek microbial identification and susceptibility testing system must be evaluated
carefully before use on SSF. Organic toxins of microbial origin in water might be
detected by using biosensors. A great deal of work will be required in evaluating the
usefulness of this type of problem-solving approach. Identifying cleaning agents
appropriate for use on SSF will require a great deal of basic investigative work. New
solvents that are Iess toxic and more biodegradable than traditional solvents are
resently being tested by the U.S. Air Force. Using a hygroscopic cloth impregnated
th a safe effective disinfectant may be a simple way to clean surfaces.
Edwin E. Geldreich, Ph.D.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Biofilms and Water Supply Systems
Data from Earth-based systems demonstrate that coliform bacteria survive many
disinfection processes. In space, coliforms will probably be important, but other
bacteria may actually be more important, particularly those that occur as biofilms or as
contaminants of the SSF water supply systems.
Potential problems will probably include minimal barriers for the elimination of
bacteria, process problems involving on-off backwashing of the water supply system,
and inadequate d_sinfectants. Other problems may include chlorine demand in grey
water, interrupted treatment, inadequate disinfection concentration or contact ume
(C'T values), and reverse-osmosis membrane degradation by microbial activity.
Some fundamental questions to be addressed include determining the health
significance of coliforms, as well as methods of suppression, particularly when they
occur as biofilms. The answers to these questions are not clear. Because of the
uniqueness of 0-g and space, questions such as these assume even greater importance.
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Housekeeping procedures in space will be a difficult problem, especially the removal of
particulate matter from the water supply systems. It will be important to maintain the
integrity of the compartments that constitute the system, as well as reducing turbidity,
because particulates can serve as carriers for bacteria. Similarly, crossflow and
backflow can contribute to serious contamination problems. Large numbers of
microorganisms can interfere with microbial population studies, though this will be
unlikely when microorganisms occur at 10 CFU/ml or less. Bacteria that clump
deserve special attention, as clumps may survive some disinfection processes. "Carbon
fines" may also serve as vehicles for bacterial transport.
Water temperature will be extremely important. An increase of 10°C in a cold water
system will increase the growth rate of bacteria significantly. Because stagnation of the
water flow can produce problems, it is important that the water in the system be
constantly moving. Dead microorganisms in the system can provide nutrients for
further bacterial growth, although assimilable organic carbon (AOC) absorption to pipe
surfaces will probably be a more realistic problem.
Bacteria will probably employ, various protective mechanisms in space. Species of
Klebsiella and EnterObacter w_ll encapsulate, which will probably protect them against
disinfection processes, particularly chlorine. Variations in cell metabolic rates may also
beprotective. Biofilm communities will provide mutual protection via slime formation
ananutrient sharing. Flushing and cleaning the water supply system will minimize the
formation of biofilms.
In order to reduce the potential for microbial contamination of the water supply
systems, certain steps must be taken. It will be extremely important to maintain
constant positive pressure in the system. Power expenditure must be evaluated in terms
of the number of organisms killed. The system must be flushed in order to eliminate
rrfi_croorgam_sms. Of special concern will be the potential for extremely tolerant
mlcroorgamsms to develop through mutation.
Charles P. Gerba, Ph.D.
University of Arizona
Microbial Risk Assessment
The spectrum of potentially dangerous water-borne pathogens, including nearly 130
viral agents, is constantly expanding in number. A risk-balance study approach is
required to establish standards for SSF. In Arizona, recycling grey water requires that
fecal coliforms not exceed 25 CFU per 100 ml of water sampled. The tolerance for
viruses and parasites is zero. When water is collected in a sump and then pumped to a
treatment pmnt, a continuous culture situation is established. Point-of-use punfiers are
employed as a means of reducing the microbial risk.
Viruses and parasites have low infective dose levels (1-10 units) in comparison to
Escherichia coli (107 CFU). Although the virus level should be zero, this is a very
difficult standard to reach. As an example of the importance of viruses, one ill
individual on SSF could contaminate the water supply system with tremendous numbers
of viral particles. The above values for microbial risk assessment refer to situations
dealing with healthy, noncompromised individuals.
The microbial risk-assessment process involves several steps, including (1) development
of standards and criteria; (2) determining sensitivity of analytical methods; (3)
determining treatment requirements; and (4) using a cost-benefit analysis. Additional
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data such as hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and
risk characterization are extremely important.
For a successful microbial risk assessment program, the treatment requirement for a
given risk of infection involving a contaminated water supply must be determined. If all
of the microbial contamination cannot be removed, standards for an acceptable level
following treatment must be developed. To avoid toxicological problems, the type and
amount of disinfectant must be selected carefully so that the microbial load in the water
supply system is neutralized.
Helen Lucia, M.D.
University of Texas Medical Branch
Bacteriolo_ of Air, Internal Surfaces, and Water
v.
The majority of bacteria found in the SSF environment will originate from human skin.
During a 14-day period, approximately 2 m a of epidermis is shed with its associated
bacteria, e.g., Staphylococcus epidermatitis, Micrococcus spp., and diptheroids.
Males have approximately a lO-fold greater concentration of skin bacteria than do
females. Gram negative bacteria tend to be associated with moist sites such as the
groin. Bacteria such as S. aureus are often spread by inhalation of skin flakes. Vigorous
activities, friction associated with clothes, and showering increase the shedding of
bacteria. Bacterial die-off (e.g.S. aureus) occurs rapidly in environments not inhabited
by humans, whereas spore-forming bacteria like Bacillus spp. remain viable for long
periods of time.
Surfaces and air in the SSF will harbor essentially identical bacteria that originated
from human skin. Organisms will be transported from surface to surface through hand
and body contact. Surfaces will be extremely difficult to keep clean. Fabrics such as
cotton and wool will tend to pull water from the air, thereby increasing the potential for
colonization and subsequent proliferation of bacteria. Plans for cleaning must include a
means of removing the large amounts of skin that will be shed. A clothes washer and
dryer will be extremely important in reducing the numbers of microorganisms present.
The degree of cleaning will determine the amount of organisms potentially present on
surfaces and in the air.
The shower stall design being proposed for SSF presents special problems, since it
appears that the system will be difficult to keep clean. In order to reduce microbial
proliferation, and reduce the possibility of bacteria such as Legionella spp. becoming a
problem, the hot water heaters must bring the water temperature up to standard.
The water system should be tested for the presence of Mycobacterium spp. On Earth,
almost all contamination problems in hospitals can be traced to the institution's water
supply system. Some organisms will grow in almost any liquid, including iodine. A
great deal of thought must be devoted to the issue of disinfectants.
Microorganisms associated with the nose and throat must also be considered,
particularly in light of possible immunocompromise states arising from living in
rmcrograwty.
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Betty H. Olson, Ph.D.
University of California at Irvine
Environmental Effects on Microorganisms
Microorganisms will develop adaptive responses to the aquatic environment of the
water supply systems in SSF. Because of the chemical content of the water, surface
tension, andbacterial proliferation, colonization of the water supply system will occur
regardless of the disinfectant employed. The formation of particles, and particle-
bacteria aggregates, is an important adaptive process. It is unknown whether 0-g will
inhibit or enhance bacterial clumping. Adherent clusters of cells tend to be more
resistant to disinfectants than cells in a planktonic stage.
Carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus are important nutrients that will probably be
available in the water supply system. Simple processes such as degassing EVA suits
may provide nutrients to the environment that can be used for microbialproliferation.
Bacterial metabolism will likely change depending upon the nutrients present.
Phenotypic changes following adaptation to the stress environment in SSF may include
changes in bacterial susceptibility, i.e., resistance to disinfectants. Such changes may
occur at the genomic level.
In order to enhance the efficiency of the disinfection protocols, bacterial cells should be
destroyed while they are in a planktonic stage. The physics of biofilm layer formation
may be important in understanding biofilm formation and attachment characteristics.
This may be critical for developing effective disinfection protocols, especially in
microgravity.
Navin K. Sinha, Ph.D.
Rutgers University
Fidelity of DNA Replication
Of special concern in the microgravity of space will be the genetic stability of
microorganisms introduced into the SSF environment. It must be expected that
genomic changes will occur in space, resulting in altered microorganisms. On Earth,
the m_tation load per genome is relatively constant regardless of the organism. A rate
of 10-_, which is approximately one mistake per 1000 genomes, is normal except for
more advanced animals, where a frequency of 1 mistake per 1 to 10 genomes often
occurs. Enzymes that serve as "biological editors" are active at different sites of
discrimination. Bacteriophages serve as agents of infection in bacterial cells. During
the replication of their DNA, discrimination occurs during nucleotide insertion and
subsequent editing. A third stage, postreplication mismatch correction, occurs in
bacteria and possibly in higher organisms.
In space, the effect of radiation upon DNA integrity and accuracy of replication will be
important. Quantifying the amount of radiation received by individuals and examining
the possible effects of the radiation on human DNA and that of their offspring must be
planned. Studying in vitro models using human cell lines and then extrapolating the
data to the human genome is a means of understanding and defining potential hazards.
Shielding for SSF should be seriously considered. Because microorganisms will be
exposed to radiation that will probably cause mutations, automated microbial systems
such as the Vitek instrument may not provide reliable data in space.
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David A. Stevens, M.D.
Stanford University Medical School
Infections in CQmpromised HOSTS
Individuals are protected against infection by a number of mechanisms, including
mechanisms such as phagocytic cells, complement amplification of the humoral immune
system resulting in antigen-antibody complexes, lymphocytes, and mechanical barriers
such as gastric acid, skin, cilia, and the cough reflex. Changes in the normal flora
resulting from use of antibiotics may result in new organisms causing infection.
Vascular insufficiency may cause loss of the protective barrier. Traumatic injury could
produce the same effect.
The immunocompromised state need not result from dramatic processes such as cancer,
but may occur as a result of burns, pregnancy, phagocytic dysfunction, splenectomy, or
even as a side effect of antibiotics usedto treat fever m patients that are neutropenic.
Because space travel will be stressful to an individual's immune system, the normal
defense barriers may be compromised even in relatively healthy people.
Measures that can be used as a means of minimizing the compromised state include
eating cooked foods to avoid viable microorganisms, using electric razors, applying
povidone iodine to the axilla, avoiding axillar shaving, avoiding the use of indwelling
catheters, having influenza, pneumococcal, and other vaccinanons, avoiding occlusive
clothing, bathing and shampooing daily, following accepted hand-washing practices
when examining individuals, and using oral hygiene aids like mouth washes. These, as
well as other precautions, such as isolating prospective space travelers from contact
with others before space flight for a duration commensurate with the incubation period
of most infectious d_seases, can contribute to maintaining a noncompromised state.
G. S. Visvesvara, Ph.D.
Centers for Disease Control
Environmental Parasitology
Approximately. 50 parasites are known agents of human disease. Free-living
opportunists like water-borne species ofEntamoeba, Giardia, Cryptosporidium,
Acanthamoeba, Naegleria, Hartmanella and Enterobius vermicularis (pinworms) are of
potential importance on SSF. Amoebae live in a wide variety of environments such as
hot tubs, carpets, and contact lens solutions.
Naegleriafowleri and,4canthamoeba spp. are known to cause meningitis or even
encephalitis if organisms enter through the nose and travel up the olfactory tract.
These organisms may also cause pneumonitis and humidifier fever. Acanthamoeba are
known agents of keratitis. Giardia, which is a water-borne organism, frequently causes
infection in individuals who consume unfiltered water. While this organism is easily
killed in water that is heated to 55-60°C for one minute, studies have shown that it can
survive on carpets for up to 48 hours.
Amoebic infections are extremely difficult to diagnose. Immunofluorescence, although
an excellent means of detection, would probably not be practical for SSF because of the
low probability of parasitic diseases. Water-borne parasites like Giardia should be
considered as potential problems, but may not be important in reality.
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